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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: APPLICATION TO
ACTIONS BETWEEN FORMER CODEFENDANTS
AS A RESULT of injuries sustained in a highway collision, A brings an
action against B and C for negligence. A consent judgment is entered
against B and C. Subsequently, B sues C for negligence in the same
collision. Can C successfully interpose the defense of collateral estoppel
on the theory that the prior consent judgment conclusively establishes
B's negligence?
In Pack v. McCoy,' the North Carolina Supreme Court recently
upheld such a defense, stating that a judgment against all defendants in
a negligence action necessarily establishes the negligence of each in any
future proceeding.2 The court applied this broad rule to a situation in
which the parties to be bound had not been adversaries and the issue of
negligence had not been litigated. The dissent forcefully contended that
state precedent should be overruled, pointing out that this holding is
contrary to the weight of authority.3
The doctrine of collateral estoppel minimizes litigation by treating
as conclusively established all facts that were litigated and determined
between the same parties in a previous suit on a different cause of action.
4
Following this functional definition, the majority of courts apply the
doctrine to former co-defendants in a suit on independent questions
only if they were adversaries in the first action.5 It is important to note
that the Pack case involved an independent action between former co-
parties, which should be distinguished from suits for indemnity or
contribution. In an independent suit the former co-defendant asserts a
25x N.C. 590, 11z S.E.zd 118 (196o).
'ld. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at xii.
'hid. at 594, 112 S.E.2d at 121. Justice Bobbitt urged that Lumberton Coach Co.
v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952), the only state precedent, be overruled.
'See Polarsky, Collateral Estoppel, 39 IOWA L. REv. 217, 219-20 0954) RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 45 (1942). See generally Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U.S. 35x (1876).
Res judicata is the generic term covering merger, bar, direct estoppel, and collateral
estoppel. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to chapter 3, (1942).
When contending that a former judgment affects the outcome of the case, a party will
plead res judicata, which is usually an affirmative defense. Cf., FED. R. Civ. P.
8(c) ; CLARK, CODE PLEADING 611-iz (2d ed. 1947).
5 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 424 (sth ed. 1925) ; see e.g., Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker,
258 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1953) ; Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.zd 446 (1952) ;
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942).
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claim that he has irrespective of the former judgment; in suits for con-
tribution and indemnity the claim is a direct result of judicial determina-
tion of liability. Although policy considerations unique to contribution
and indemnity cases have resulted in judicial disagreement over the
applicability of collateral estoppel to these actions," nearly all courts
apply the adversary requirement to independent suits between former
co-parties.7
'In the contribution action often the co-defendant who lost in the first action will
be suing one who put up a successful defense. A rule which would allow the successful
co-defendant to set up his former victory as a defense in the contribution action is at least
arguably meritorious in as much as contribution and indemnity are in a sense derived
rights. He has been adjudged not negligent toward the former plaintiff once and perhaps
should not have to pay damages in a contribution action predicated on his joint liability
to that same plaintiff. The courts, however, are split over which rule to follow in the in-
demnity and contribution situations. For cases holding that the former judgment con-
clusively establishes only the liability or non-liability of each co-defendant to the former
plaintiff, see City of Mobile v. George, 253 Ala. 591, 45 So. zd 778 (x95o) ; Preferred
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 Conn. 536, 52 A.zd 867
(947); Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d x65
(1949) ; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. x2o, 5 N.W.zd 397 (942) ;
cf., Hobbs v. Hurley, 11 7 Me. 449, xo Atl. 815 (x918) ; Gleason v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co., 324 Mass. 695, 88 N.E.zd 632 0949). See also Employer's Liab. Assur.
Corp. v. Post & McCord, 286 N.Y. 754, 36 N.E.zd 135 (1941). Other courts adhere
to the adversary rule in both situations. See e.g., Appell v. Schneider & Pomerantz
Baking Co., 126 Conn. 16, 8 A.2d 529 (1939) ; Bakula v. Schwab, x67 Wis. 546, 168
N.W. 378 (1918) (dictum). However, the policies here involved are not germane to
a suit predicated on independent as distinguished from derived rights, and although
perhaps the adversary rule should be applied in each situation, the problems should be
separately analyzed. See Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (.952);
cf., Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (1934); Snyder v. Marken, i16
Wash. 270, 199 Pac. 302 (1921); 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 424-25.
7See Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 125 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd per curiam
224 F.zd 644 (3rd Cir. 1955); Lowery v. Muse, x5i A.zd 263 (D.C. Mun. App.
1959); Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1953); Bunge v. Yager, 236
Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952); Pearlman v. Truppo, io N.J. Misc. 477, 159 Atl.
623 (1932); opinion adopted 1o N.J. Misc. 772, 16o At. 334 (1932); Wiles v.
Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (934); Byrum v. Ames & Webb, 196 Va. 597,
85 S.E.2d 364 (955); Snyder v. Marken, ix6 Wash. 270, 199 Pac. 302 (192.); 9
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5835 (1955).
Some courts merely state that co-defendants are not bound. See Buhler v. Villec,
117 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 196o), which is based on LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2286
(i945); Clark v. Naufel, 328 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (.950); Trotter v. Klein,
140 Misc. 78, 249 N.Y. Supp. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
The New York courts are in complete disagreement on the question. Contpare
Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc. 2d 994, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Mun. Ct. x956), and Bennett
v. Mitchell, z Misc. 2d i16, x51 N.Y.S.zd 574 (Sup. Ct. 1956), with Glaser v. Huette,
232 App. Div. I19, 249 N.Y. Supp. 374 (1931), and Trotter v. Klein, 140 Misc. 78,
249 N.Y. Supp. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
There is some dispute among authorities as to what constitutes adversaries. Most
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The adversary requirement is based on important practical considera-
tions. Our system of procedure demands that each party be able to
utilize his tactics and strategy against his opponent to the best advantage.
Co-defendants, however, are often placed in a difficult position. The
plaintiff chooses the time and place of trial and joins the defendants.'
Although some states permit cross-claims between co-parties, co-
defendants may wish to litigate their own claims in another court at a
different time.9 Co-defendants should be allowed to direct their trial
strategy against the plaintiff without prejudicing their right to subse-
quently litigate their independent claims.10 Without cross-pleadings, a
jurisdictions require cross-pleadings or an issue raised by one party to which the other
can demur or enter a denial. See Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1953);
Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.zd 446 (1952); Byrum v. Ames & Webb,
196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955)5 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5; RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942). Some expressly negate any requirement of cross-pleadings and
stress the actual determination of conflicting claims between the parties. See Gleason v.
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 324 Mass. 695, 88 N.E.2d 632 (i949); Godomsky v. Free-
man, 12o N.J.L. 116, 298 Atl. 391 (1938); Wright v. Schick, i34 Ohio St. 193, 16
N.E.2d 321 (1938) ; z BLAcK, JUDGMENTS §§ 599, 614 (ad ed. 1902) ; cf., Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 95 F.zd 6o5 (ioth Cir. 1938). Affidavits asserting an adverse
position have also been determinative. See Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 297
Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441 (1944).
The requirement of an adverse position is of long-standing. See e.g., Bufflngton
v. Cook, 35 Ala. 312 (1859); Cornwell v. Thompson, 5o Ill. 329 (1869); Jones v.
Vert, 121 Ind. 140, 22 N.E. 88z (1889). Only a few decisions support the instant
case. See Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc. 2d 994, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Mun. Ct. 1956);
Bennett v. Mitchell, 2 Misc. 2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; Lumberton
Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (952).
e See Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952); Merrill v. St.
Paul City Ry., 170 Minn. 332, 2xz N.W. 533 (1927); cf., Pullman Co. v. Cincin-
nati, N.O. & T.P. R.R., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S.W. 385 (19T2) (plaintiff joined several
defendants in order to defeat removal to federal court and ignored some at trial).
Both suits are frequently in progress at the same time, and it is mere chance as to
which is first concluded. In such a situation a defendant may wish to forego his appeal
to concentrate on winning the suit in which he is plaintiff. Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va.
6oi, 175 S.E. 41 (934) see Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 125 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Pa.
1954) 5 Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (1934).
' For cases applying the adversary requirement in jurisdictions permitting cross-
claims see Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, 175 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Pa. 1954)i Lowery v.
Muse, 151 A.2d 263 (D.C. Mun. App. 1959)5 Pearlman v. Truppo, io N.J. Misc.
477, 259 At1. 623 (932) 5 Byrum v. Ames & Webb, 196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364
(1955) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 82, comments a-b (1942). It has been pointed
out that an application of collateral estoppel would in effect make cross-claims com-
pulsory where the legislature intended them to be permissive. Lowery v. Muse, supra,
at 265; see Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.zd 446 (2952); 34 B.U.L. REV.
104 (2954).
"°Cf., Mickadeit v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 274 Kan. 484, 257 P.2d 156
(1953) 5 Pearlman v. Truppo, io N.J. Misc. 477, 159 Adt. 623 (1932) 5 Bakula v.
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co-defendant cannot produce or cross-examine witnesses concerning the
co-parties' rights inter se and, therefore, is obviously in no position
to establish his co-defendant's liability to him." A co-defendant may
also choose to default or consent to judgment due to personal motives
or a small amount in controversy. 12  The adversary requirement, by
guarantying that only adversaries will be precluded in the fu'ture,
allows co-defendants to concentrate on the plaintiff without having to
weigh the effect of each move on their independent claims. The im-
portant policy implicit in the adversary requirement is perhaps best
summed up by one court: "The need for expedition and conclusion in
litigation is not greater than the need for opportunity for .. the fair
and full trial of an issue."13
Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, x68 N.W. 378 (19x8); Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38
YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1929). If each co-defendant must be concerned about the effect
on future litigation with his co-party, his defense may be weakened and a plaintiff's
"divide and conquer" tactics greatly facilitated.
"1 See Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S.W. 385
(i912) 5 Godomsky v. Freeman, 12o N.J.L. 116, 198 Adt. 391 (1938); Self v. Inter-
national Ry., 224 App. Div. 238, 230 N.Y. Supp. 34 (1928) ; Bakula v. Schwab, x67
Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (xg8). The theory of the defense may be inconsistent with
pleadings which allow such tactics. As one court said where the plaintiff apparently
operated on different theories in each case, "The evidence each offered in that suit was
for the purpose of defending against the plaintiff's claim, not for the purpose of having
adjudicated an issue between themselves." Byrum v. Ames & Webb, x96 Va. 597, 6oi,
85 S.E.zd 364, 366 0955). Cf., Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, iz5 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.
Pa. 1954) (different lawyers in each suit).
It has been pointed out that a co-defendant cannot appeal from a ruling affecting
his co-party. See Merrill v. St. Paul City Ry., 170 Minn. 332, 212 N.W. 533 (1927);
Pearlman v. Truppo, io N.J. Misc. 477, 159 Adt. 623 (1932); Bakula v. Schwab, 167
Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (198).
"' See note 20 infra. For similar reasons a co-defendant may not wish to defend
vigorously. See Crow v. Crow, 70 Ore. 534, 139 Pac. 854 (913) (co-defendant at-
tempting to deprive estranged wife of interest in his property by collusive lawsuits) ;
Von Moschzisker, supra note io. It is interesting to note how often the first plaintiff
was a guest in the second plaintiff's automobile. The insurance company is probably
silently present here. See e.g., Kimmel v. Yankee Lines, xz5 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Pa.
1954); Wiles v. Young, 167 Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (1934) 5 Owen v. Dixon, x62
Va. 6ot, 175 S.E. 41 (1934).
"Godomsky v. Freeman, 12o N.J.L. 116, 1z, 198 At. 391, 393 (938).
Although often unnoticed the issue may vary slightly in the two suits. See Hellenic
Lines v. The Exmouth, 253 F.zd 473 (2d Cir.) (admiralty rule of major-minor fault),
cert. denied, American Export Lines v. Hellenic Lines, 356 U.S. 967 (1958) S cf. Casey
v. Balunas, i9 Conn. Supp. 365, 113 A.zd 867 (1955) 5 Mickadeit v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 174 Kan. 484, 257 P.2d x56 (x953) ; Godomsky v. Freeman, supra (agency
determinative in the first suit). This is especially true of "last clear chance" which,
although it is seldom mentioned in the opinions, would seem to be applicable to most
three-way accidents. See Hardy v. Rosenthal, 2 Cal. App. 2d 442, 38 P.2d 412 (1934)
[Vol. x96t: x67
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In several jurisdictions a pleading rule forbids litigation of inde-
pendent questions between co-parties. 14 In North Carolina this pleading
rule, juxtaposed to the court's failure to follow the adversary require-
ment, places co-defendants in a highly perplexing situation. They have
no opportunity to determine their claims in the first suit and are pre-
vented by collateral estoppel from doing so in any subsequent action.15
Consequently, a party may be completely denied redress in court. This
last reason alone is sufficient to demand that collateral estoppel be
applied only to adversaries.
The court, in addition to failing to follow the adversary require-
ment, apparently ignored the rule that collateral estoppel applies only
to issues which have been actually litigated in a previous suit by applying
the doctrine to a consent judgment. 6 This result is often reached by
Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, x6o S.E. 71 (I93). See also PROSSER, TORTS § 5z
(2d ed. 1955).
' See Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.zd 9 (Ky. 1953); Self v. International
Ry., 224 App. Div. 238, 23o N.Y. Supp. 34 (1928) 5 Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104
S.E.2d 833 (1958) 5 Wrenn v. Graham, 236 N.C. 719, 74 S.E.zd 232 (1953) ; Horton
v. Perry, 229 N.C. 319, 49 S.E.zd 734 (1948). Cross-actions for contribution are
permitted in North Carolina. See Horton v. Perry, supra; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ I-2221
1-240 (.953).
North Carolina only requires the litigant to be a party to the judgment before
being bound. See Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (952)5
Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 234 N.C. 51, 65 S.E.2d 505 (95). But cf.,
Stanley v. Parker, 207 N.C. i59, 176 S.E. 279 (934). See also Powell v. Ingram,
231 N.C. 427, 57 S.E.2d 315 (1950).
" Some courts follow both this pleading rule forbidding litigation inter se and the
requirement of an adversary position before applying collateral estoppel. See Clark's
Adm'x v. Rucker, supra note 14; cf., Self v. International Ry., supra note 145 2
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 599. In these jurisdictions the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should seldom apply to such an action. The only instance of a court following
both rules and still applying collateral estoppel is Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.zd 441 (1944), where co-defendants had submitted
affidavits asserting their adverse position. For a criticism of this result see Brown Hotel
Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 3i Ky. 396, 224 S.W.zd 165 0949).
"See United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Cromwell v.
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) ; James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel,
io8 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 178 (1959); Polarsky, supra note 4, at 222; Von Moschzisker,
supra note io, at 301; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45, comment c (1942).
A court entering a consent judgment will normally determine only if the parties
were capable of consenting and if they actually did consent. See Risk v. Director of
Ins., 141 Neb. 488, 3 N.W.2d 922 (1942)5 James, supra. The court does not
examine the merits of the claim but merely records the agreement; there is no actual
litigation. Accord, Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.zd 324 (ioth Cir. 1948) 5
see Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745, 225 S.W.2d 315 (1949) ; Cutter
v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, 151 N.E. 167 (1926). There can be no appeal
from a consent judgment. As an eminent jurist has said, "But neither party can
complain of a consent order for the error in it, if there is any, is their own, and not
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failing to distinguish between collateral estoppel and merger and bar.11
The dissent in the instant case stresses the necessity of such a differentia-
tion.18
Consent judgments are essentially contracts and should be so con-
strued.19 Their similarity to contracts of settlement and release is
marked, as both are important methods of compromise.20 Releases
cannot be introduced in evidence in a different cause of action,21 and
the error of the court." Dora v. Lesinski, 351 Mich. 579, 582, 88 N.W.zd 592, 594.
(1958) (Justice Voelker quoting Judge Cooley in Chapin v. Perrin, 46 Mich. 130, 13 1,8 N .w. 121, 122 (i88)).
17 See James, supra note x6, at 183. The opinions simply state that res judicata
applies to consent judgments. See O'Cedar Corp. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 66 F.zd
363 ( 7 th Cir. 1933) 5 Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 12 Pac. 480 (1886) ; Biggio
v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 177 N.E. 336 (1930) ; Stone v. Carolina Coach Co., 238
N.C. 662, 78 S.E.zd 6o5 (953) Crow v. Crow, 70 Ore. 534, 139 Pac. 854 (x9i4);
i FREEMAN, op. dt. supra note 5, at § 663.
2"Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 595, i12 S.E.zd x18, 122 (196o).
'9See Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745, 225 S.W.2d 315 (1949)
James, supra note 16 at 175i Comment, Collateral Estoppel by JAudgments, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 647, 656 (1952); cf., Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (oth
Cir. 1948) ; State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Great Northern Ry., 134 Minn. 249, 158
N.W. 972 (1916); LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.W. 359 (1932). But
cf., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 119 A.2d 172
01955) 3 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 1350.
"See Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., supra note 19; Gibson v. Gordon, 213
N.C. 666, 197 S.E. 135 (938) ; James, supra note 16, at 19o.
Consent judgments are especially important in settling minors' claims, as they are
not bound by their contracts, and an out of court settlement with a contract of release
would be useless. See Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.2d 700 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954) ; Pack
v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (196o) (dissenting opinion); James, supra
note 16, at 19o. The situation applies to mental incompetency as well. See Gibson v.
Gordon, supra.
Insurance companies also employ consent judgments frequently when representing
insured defendants. See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (xoth Cir.
1948); Biggio v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930). For a criticism of the
latter case see James, supra note 16, at 189, 192; 1o B.U.L. REv. 565 (1930). This
decision resulted in the passage of remedial legislation, which was unfortunately re-
stricted to situations involving compulsory insurance. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 23 1, § 140
A (1932)5 see Macheras v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass. 485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946).
More often the role of the insurance company is silent although it completely controls
the defense. See Risk v. Director of Ins., 141 Neb. 488, 3 N.W.2d 992 (1942) ; Stone
v. Carolina Coach Co., 238 N.C. 662, 78 S.E.2d 605 (1953); James, supra note
16, at 191. Although the right is usually reserved in the contract, there is some
conflict over the power of the insurance company to consent to judgment and the
effect of such a judgment. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.zd 937 (1953). Compare Fikes v.
Johnson, 22o Ark. 448, 248 S.W.2d 362 (1952), and Daniel v. Adorno, 107 A.zd
700 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954), qath Long v. Union Indem. Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178
N.E. 737 (931).
"See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § zo6, (3 rd ed. 1940 ) ; cf., MCCORMICK, EViDENCE
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consent judgments should receive comparable treatment.2 /"
Applying collateral estoppel to consent judgments discourages settle-
ments by making the use of the device less desirable.23 A party will be
less willing to settle small claims for fear of the effect on future litiga-
tion.2" With this rule in effect, parties are forced to settle all their
claims at once or, more often, to litigate them all at the same time.25
The policy of encouraging settlements and minimizing litigation should
prohibit this extension of the doctrine.
Courts today often extend the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in the frequently erroneous belief that they are eliminating unnecessary
litigation. 26  The instant case, blindly following a single precedent,27
rejected the settled adversary rule which has long safeguarded the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel. Furthermore, by failing to analyze the
problems involved in consent judgments, the court, adding error to
error, applied collateral estoppel to a judgment that did not result from
litigation. If the court had more thoroughly analyzed the policies and
practical considerations involved in the case, it would have reached a
different result.
§ 76 (954). For a good statement of the rule concerning settlement and release see
Penn Dixie Lines v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 557, 78 S.E.ad 410, 413-14 (1953).
-'Accord, James, supra note 16, at 175; Polarsky, supra note 4, at z6. Some
courts while admitting the contractual nature of a consent judgment, apply collateral
estoppel unless the parties agree not to apply it, cf., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v.
Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 19 A.zd 172 (1955). Others entirely fail to see the
contractual nature of the judgment. See e.g., Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 32
Pac. 480 (1886)5 Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 234 N.C. 51, 65 S.E.2d 505
(1951).
" See James, supra note 36, at 184; Polarsky, supra, note 4, at 2z85 Comment, Col-
lateral Estoppel by Judg-Inents, 52 COLUM. L. Rav. 647, 657 (1952). But see Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 426-27, ii9 A.2d 172, 376
(1955). For an interesting case which would discourage the use of consent judgments
see Crow v. Crow, 70 Ore. 534, 139 Pac. 854 (1933).
2' See Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745, 225 S.W.2d 315 (3949);
James, supra note 16, at 185, 387.
" party is likely to contest every small claim or minor issue to the end if a
present determination or consent judgment may be used against him in future litigation
of which he is presently unaware. Cf., The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.zd 927 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). It would seem, however, that in cases
involving status, such as divorce, custody, and in rem proceedings, consent judgments
should be given collateral effect. See Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal. 2d 33, 18, 393
P.zd 728, 732 (1948); Polarsky, suprz note 4, at 231-32 5 Von Moschzisker, supra
note io, at 3045 cf., z BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIvORcE, AND SEPARATION § 1533 (3893).
Compare, Polarsky, supra note 4, at z5o-5 1.
"See, e.g., Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc. zd 994, 157 N.Y.S.zd 684 (Munic. Ct.
z956).
2'Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E,zd 673 (1952).
Vol. x96'i: 167] COLLAITERAL ESTOPPEL
An Index to Modern Legal Problems
On each of the following topics, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS has published or will
publish a symposium dealing with the legal, economic, administrative, and other social-sclenco
aspects of the subject. The date indicates the year of publication.
Agricultural Adjustment in the South
Air Cargo
Alcoholic Beverage Control
Alimony
Atomic Power Development
Aviation Transport
Children of Divorced Parents
Close Corporation
Collection of Real Property Taxes
Collective Bargaining Under the
Wagner Act
Combating the Loan Shark
Commercial Arbitrationt
Commercial Codet
Consumption Taxes
Cooperatives
Correction of Youthful Offenders
Crime and Correction
Delivered Pricing
Divorce: A Re-examination of
Basic Concepts
Emergency Price Control Act
Enemy Property
Excess Profits Taxation
Expert Testimony
Farm Tenancy Legislation
Federal Courts
Federal Employers' Liability Actf
Federal Income and Estate Taxation
Federal Powers Over Crime
Financial Protection for the Motor
Accident Victim
Financing Small Business
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Legislation
Governmental Marketing Barriers
Government Tort Liability
Hemispheric Trade
Home Financing
Housing
Immigration
Instalment Selling
Institutional Investments
International Human Rightst
International Trade Barriers
Interterritorial Freight Rates
Investment of Trust Funds
Labor Dispute Settlement
Labor in Wartime
Land Planning in a Democracy
Legislative Reapportionment 1952
Literary and Artistic Products and
Copyright Problems 1954
Loan Shark Problem Today 1954
Low-Cost Housing and Slum Clearance 1934
Medical Care 1939
Migratory Divorce 1935
Narcotics 1957
Nationalization of British Industries 1951
New Look in Corporation Law 1958
Obscenity and the Arts 1955
Old Age Security and Welfare Titles
of the Social Security Act 1936
Patent Systeml 1947, 1948
Presidential Office 1956
Preventive Law of Conflicts 1956
Price Control in a Cold War , 1954
Price Discrimination and Price
Cutting 1937
Private Insurance 1950
Protection for the Consumer of
Food and Drugs 1933
Radio and Televisiont 1957, 1958
Railroad Reorganization 1940
Regulation of Insurance 1950
Regulation of Natural Gas 1954
Religion and the State 1949
River Basin Development 1957
School Pupils and the Law 1955
Secured Commercial Financing 1948
Securities Actl 1937
Sentencing 1958
Sex Offenses 1960
Sherman Antitrust Act and Its
Enforcement 1940
Small Business 1959
State Tradingt 1959
Trade-Marks in Transition 1949
Transportationt 1959, 1960
"Unauthorized Practice of Law"
Controversy 1938
Unemployment Compensation 1936
Urban Housing and Planning 1955
Wage Earners' Life Insurance 1935
Wage and Hour Law 1939
War Claims 1951
War Contract Renegotiation 1943
War Contract Terminationt 1944
Water Resources 1957
Subscriptions: $7.50 per year ($8.00 foreign; $7.65 Canada; $7.85 Pan-America).
Single Copies: $2.50 each ($2.65 foreign, $2.55 Canada, $2.60 Pan-America). Copies of all
back issues are available.
Buk Orders: On orders for ten or more copies of a single issue a discount of 20 per cent
is applicable, f.o.b. Durham, N. C.
Complete sets: Arrangements can be made to supply complete sets, unbound, at a discount
of 20 per cent from the combined price for the individual issues, f.o.b. Durham, N. C.
t Published in two parts, priced separately.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I I
DUIKE STATION DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA
